When filing a divorce complaint, it would seem that a typical lawyer would theoretically make as much of a standard claim as possible in theory, to go to court or to take action against the weaker lawyer; a frequently mentioned strategy is "throw as much mud on the wall and see what sticks!" It appears that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (RCP 1020 and 1021) specifically support this strategy, allowing for alternative and contradictory claims. Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explicitly held that "(t) he rules reflect the general principle that plaintiffs do not have to be compulsory in choosing a particular theory to advance the claim." Republic Intermodal Corporation and Sullivan Lines, Inc. v. Doris Leasing Company, Inc. and Union National of Pittsburgh, 473 p. (1976).
When filing a divorce complaint, it appears that most attorneys are relying on the aforementioned strategy to simultaneously file for divorce claims under 3301 (c), 3301 (d), and sometimes under section 3301 (a) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, as a standard practice. For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the Divorce Code, section 3301 (c) permits a guilty divorce after both parties have filed a consent statement and ninety (90) days have elapsed after the divorce has been filed. . Section 3301 (d) allows a spousal security after two (2) years of separation by a spouse. 3301 (a) is a common and outdated guilt-based divorce claim.
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure seem to allow for alternative claims, although they are in the context of divorce, in many cases there are increasing cases of proscribing alternative claims for divorce. The question that arises is: Can a plaintiff file in a divorce action, sections 3301 (c) and 3301 (d) and / or 3301 (a), a permit for filing a divorce action? Apparently, in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence mentioned above, the plaintiff wants a petition in a divorce action. However, courts have increasingly restricted this right in certain situations.
In more and more cases, the Pennsylvania courts have ruled that the plaintiff may oppose a divorce proceeding as quickly as possible against prejudices that are unfair and unfair. Accordingly, if the plaintiff submits under section 3301 (c), the courts have increasingly taken the view that it may refuse to file an unauthorized release under section 3301 (c). The damage to the contract is quite obvious: first, filing a divorce action often involves filing an alimony pending. Alimony pendente lite is in favor of an adversary who can only be claimed for dependence on a divorce action. Accordingly, extending an inherent divorce action is an extension of the length of time the alimony has to pay pending litigation. Second, it extends the length of time the parties marry, which can have several consequences. Courts have taken the view that refusing a single divorce action is an abuse of the divorce process and cannot benefit from the divorce action without taking reasonable steps.
Although the courts have refused to allow the Affirmative Commission to file, can the courts require a party to file an affidavit? So far, the courts have been reluctant to enforce a Confirmation Permit. So far, cases that decide on this issue have been punished for not accepting a single divorce action, which may be an act of divorce. This, by definition, excludes alimonia pendente lite at the same time. There are still no sanctions against the party refusing to authorize her divorce action, as part of the penalties to be assessed, but the case does not preclude that outcome.
There is a growing number of cases where the party has refused to file for divorce when the party receives spousal support rather than pending litigation. The crucial distinction between spousal support and alimony pendente lite is that spousal support is not subject to the existence of a divorce action. A spouse can successfully apply for assistance and a spouse fails a divorce proceeding, but it is final when the parties get divorced. Therefore, dismissing the divorce action as a punishment for refusing an unauthorized declaration does not harm the fact that you are being ordered to support a spouse who is against you. In this case, the arguments of the judicial economy are raised in the context of the particular facts of each case. The specific issue is that a divorce claim has a positive impact on the spousal support claim. Otherwise, dismissing the claim will not be a viable alternative to correct the adversary's claim. In this situation, penalties should be highly valued in order to remedy the unfair situation.
In the final analysis, when filing a divorce, one must realize that the spousal support or alimony order is pending in relation to the speed at which the divorce action should proceed. Similarly, if there is a case under section 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code, you must be prepared to file a leave of absence; otherwise, it should be done only in other sections of the Divorce Code. Important cases on this subject are: Skelly v. Skelly, 36 Pa. DC4th 189 (1997); Norris v. Norris, 10 Pa. D. and C.4th 207 (1991); Mellot v. Mellot, 1 Pa.D. & C.4th 618 (1988); Burk v. Burk, 38 Pa.D. & C.3d 558 (1986); Way v. Way, 35 Pa.D. & C.3d 653 (1985); Rueckert v. Rueckert, 20 Pa.D. & C.3d 191 (1981).